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INTEGRATING THE GENERALIZED OTHER INTO THEORIES OF DIFFERENCE:
BALANCING AND BRIDGING IN SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM*

ABSTRACT

Symbolic interactionist theories need to use the generalized in order to explain difference,
but this essential term has been neglected. A "sense of group position" has been used to focus on
difference, but this term is too structural. To bridge this gap in symbolic interactionism, we
show that a generalized other is socially constructed through framing; this process of social
construction involves internalization or externalization; multiple generalized others routinely
exist and they create multiple selves; generalized others may be positive or negative; generalized
others are ranked in terms of importance to the self; and difference springs from these different
rankings.

Keywords: generalized other; theories of difference; symbolic interactionism; framing

Symbolic interactionist theories have had a long and intimate history of dealing with
difference using the self in interaction with others, especially concerning race, ethnicity and gender.
However, these explanations of difference do not always follow the basic tenets of symbolic
interactionism (SI). In most SI work, the "generalized other" is often overlooked and the "self'
dominates theoretical and empirical discussion. This causes a more inward-looking SI focused on
the self, and makes it harder to have an additional outwardly-focused SI that could use the
construction of the "other" to better explain inequality and contribute to solving agency-structure
problems. To have difference beyond the basic individual and external world level, one must
compare two conceptions of "others," but the study of the self alone does not make this apparent.
Schwalbe et al. (2000) clearly focus on "othering" and inequality in an SI format, and we follow their
example with greater attention to the basic theory of SI by balancing attention to selves with multiple
generalized others, and by bridging traditional SI to a number of structural and even exchange
theories in social psychology.
First, a balance needs to be established between the highly studied "self' and the neglected
"generalized other." SI's almost exclusive research focus on the self or identity has limited its
abilities to explain difference. We claim that multiple "generalized others" can be used as a means of
explaining difference in a more social constructionist way than with a "sense of group position" as it
is currently presented. SI needs to use its basic concepts to explain difference through social
interaction rather than using a structural deux ex machina. Difference in this paper is used in a wide
focus and it can be constructed around a number of issues from being an enthusiastic gang or team
member to larger groupings of class, race and gender (i.e., any in- or out-group). Our task is to show
how group difference is constructed and transferred between people using "the generalized other."
Thus, multiple generalized others" need to be connected to multiple selves and difference comes
about from being positively perceived by one generalized other and negatively (or less positively)
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viewed by another. Situational and role-based behavior play a much smaller part than many
symbolic interactionists have indicated.
Second, effective bridges can also be made between SI and identity theory (Burke 2004,
2006), expectation states theory (Ridgeway et al. 1998; Ridgeway 2006 a,b ), and an affect theory of
social exchange (Lawler 2001; Lawler et al. 2008). For instance, it is important to differentiate
person-based, role-based and socially-based identity and feelings (Stets and Burke 2005: 13-4).
While only one of these three theories directly refers to the "self' (identity theory substitutes
"identity" for the self but does use the term), and none of them actually use the "generalized other,"
these theories are structurally close enough to bring insights to bear on SI. Although this "bridge" is
not a synthesis of these theories as Stryker (2008) would like, it brings in some of their compatible
ideas.
We proceed in four steps. The first step shows how the "generalized other" (abbreviated as
the GO except in quotations) has been described and then neglected in most SI theories, and the
second shows how theories of difference have been constructed in SI theory without using the GO.
Third, five points are made to balance the self and GO, and to bridge the gap between the GO and
difference. The fourth section presents examples from a study of race and another study of gender.
And the fifth step is to provide an overall model of the GO in SI.
The Generalized Other in Traditional Symbolic Interactionism
Mead's theory centers the concepts of the"!," the "me," and the GO. These concepts relate
to how the self is formed in relation to the broader groups with which the self is interacting. The
"me" represents the socialized aspect of the self that makes presentations to the outside world where
people observe the me. The "!" reviews and objectifies the "me" as others reflect their performance
evaluations via the looking glass self, and it represents the sometimes unpredictable and creative part
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of the self that is tactical and decisive (see Lewis 1979). 1 For Mead, the GO is constructed from
many different occurrences of taking the perspective of the other. Mead defined the GO as "the
organized community or social group which gives to the individual his unity of self' (Mead 1934:
154).
The GO provides the opportunity for reflexivity when the actor takes him or herself not only
as subject but as an object as well (Mead 1934). It is through the GO that the community exercises
control over its individual members. These attitudes toward the other then reflexively act upon the
"I" and the "me," and the "self." The GO represents one's reflections on the sum total of the
"reflected appraisals" of others toward one's performances, and can be viewed as a generalization
about the various "me's" that are preformed. Mead's concept of GO is a fundamental theoretical
concept that forms the foundation of intelligence in the "mind," the basis of the self-consciousness,
the overall "self," and the link to social structure and community in "society" (Mead 1934; 2002: 1908). The GO refers to the possibility of the internalization of norms through the process of interaction
with other members of society, and can be formed only in a social or virtual group. It is often the
basis of morality, as the ability to gain a moral consciousness depends gaining the perspective of the
GO (Mead 1934).
Although Mead rarely uses "the looking glass self," Cooley's concept provides a basis for the
GO in three ways: imagining one's performance before an other, developing some understanding
through empathy about their judgment of your performance, and one's subsequent intellectual and
emotional reaction to that judgment (Cooley 1922: 184). This alone is not the GO, but when the
looking glass self or the "particular other" is combined with framing others, it impregnates the self
with the "social." This step would lead to a full conception of the GO.
1

The I in Mead is somewhat like Burke's "comparator" with an "identity standard" but the "I" is

a larger concept functioning as the 'decider' on issues other than identity.
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Mead is somewhat ambiguous on whether there are multiple GOs, especially connected to
race or gender. He mentions family, political parties, friendship circles, nations, classes, political
parties, clubs, corporations, and subgroups (debtors or creditors) as "social group(s) as a whole to
which" people belong (1934: 156-9). These could provide a basis for multiple GOs even though he
frequently mentions the GO in the singular. In his 1927 lectures, Mead briefly mentions multiple
GOs in baseball games, vox populi (public opinion) and vox Dei (voice of god) (1982: 145). Some
theorists are highly critical of Mead on this point. Meltzer says that Mead "oversimplifies the
concept by assuming ... a single universal generalized other" (1994: 51). Charon (2007: 77) says
that Mead "does not always make it clear if the individual has just one generalized other or several"
and Lewis claims that "Mead's own statements about the generalized other are not theoretically
sophisticated enough to account for ... complex interactions" (1979:283). 2
While Blumer's account of the self and the GO (1969) follows Mead, he delves deeper into
the GO in a series of letters from 1979 to 1982. He lays out six levels of the GO: (I) "abstract
human group life" or humanity, (2) an "abstraction of the common meanings of society," (3) "the
abstract role of one's particular segment or circle in society," (4) an individualized version of an
"abstract role in society" or "one's special circle," (5) the role of participants in a "given concrete
situation" where "the GO would shift from one situation-area to another" (e.g., from a baseball game
to a church wedding), and (6) a "unique version of the complex of roles in a given situation-arena"
(Blumer 2004: 117-8). He says that "the number of GOs in a society would correspond to the
number of different social acts in that society ... in which he was prepared to participate," and
consequently, he saw it as "embracing large combinations of separate acts" (2004: 126). These letters
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Antonio states that "Habermas views Mead as a path-breaking thinker who recognized implicitly

the significance of communicative rationality but failed to express it full and rigorously in theory
(1989:737; Habermas 1987:1-111).

4

are a rare insight into Blumer's thoughts about multiple GOs, but Blumer never systematized this in
print, and many of his responses are contingent - "If Mead meant this, then that would result."
Goffman' s dramaturgical approach focuses on one set of presentations of self in the front
stage to intended audiences and another set of presentations to the back stage to fellow performers or
supporters. His distinction between the stage and the audience leads to an important insight that
could connect to the GO. Clearly, Goffman is thinking of two distinctly different "GOs," but he does
not refer to the "I," the "me," or the GO. In this phase of his work, he is more concerned with roles
and ritual theory rather than placing front stage and back stage into a SI framework (Collins 1988).
In Goffman's later work, he used the "frame," which could be connected to the GO. He develops
multiple frames and mentions "anchoring" processes that connect an activity to the "primary
frameworks of particular social groups" (1986: 247-300). But in addition to switching frames, he
allows for frame breaking, both of which keep this process from being deterministic (1974: 3, 25-7).
However, Goffman looks at these frames or interaction orders as somewhat episodic, not as
how people construct multiple GOs. 3 Goffman frequently said that "(m)y perspective is situational"
(1974: 8) and this tends to crowd out the GO. Although he often refers to groups, he seems to avoid
viewing groups and their social construction as part of one's self formation process. To Goffman,
the ensemble of actors is necessary, but he does not analyze them as a GO. In other words, his
audience is passive, perhaps too much like a theater audience. While focusing on the self, Goffman
generally avoids the remaining basics of SI (i.e., the I, me and GO)' and does not generate a theory of
the GO and difference, which would need to go well beyond situations. 5

3

From this point on, we use "framing" in a way different from Goffman, one that refers to schemata

that shapes groups or network contacts, which bears more similarity to the social movement
literature.
4

Collins argues that Goffman is not a symbolic interactionist (1988, 2004), but Scheff argues that he
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Symbolic Interactionist Theories of Difference
For Blumer, racial prejudice of the dominant group is a matter of the racial identification one
makes of one's self and others, and the way the out group is conceived in relation to the dominant
group. In focusing on the feelings of the dominant racial group, Blumer describes their beliefs in
intrinsic difference, superiority, and privileges, and fears that the other will eliminate those privileges
(Blumer 1958, 1965; Bobo and Hutchings 1996). First, group feelings point to and depend on the
positional arrangement of the groups. This process is especially helped along by the active molding
of these beliefs, privileges and fears by interest groups, and the whole process develops in a historical
process rather than being created anew in each interaction. Second, the source of prejudice for
Blumer specifically lies in the felt challenges to these feelings in: (1) affronts to feelings of group
superiority, (2) familiarity or transgressing the boundary line of group exclusiveness, (3)
encroachments of proprietary claim to goods or services, (4) challenges to power and privilege, and
(5) direct and sometimes indirect economic competition for jobs (Blumer 1990:201). Prejudice
becomes a defensive reaction and a protective device to each of these challenges. Often these
situations evoke emotions of fear, and societies built upon difference often use fear to keep the other
in their place.
Third, the sense of difference is not created spontaneously but whatever interaction that is
involved is embedded in a history of past contacts, especially initial contact. Subsequent experiences
and interactions may form the sense of group position in several ways, whereby it is strengthened or
sharpened or weakened. It may be deeply entrenched and resist change, or may barely take root

is because of the basic structures of his work (2006). Goffman preferred the term "strategic

interaction."
5

Some other interpreters of Mead have a more philosophical focus on universals, ethics or political

theory (Joas 1985: 119-44; Pfuetze 1954:75-8; Camic and Joas 2004: 5; Benhabib1992: 148-77).
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(Blumer 1990: 202). However the experiences may mold the sense of group position, it is clear that
the sense of group position formed by the dominant group defines and redefines the subordinate
group.
Fourth, a sense of group position is initially molded and shaped by the elite members of the
dominant group (e.g., politicians and ministers in speeches and sermons). They repeat narratives that
attack and question character of the subordinate group, and stimulate individuals to energize the
group. If the feelings and views are not internally opposed, they fuse and grow. Thus, the collective
image of the subordinate group and the sense of group position of the dominant group are
established. Three implications arise from the subordinate group being seen as an abstraction: (I)
the actual definitions of the subordinate group do not derive from experiences with specific
individuals in daily association but through transcending characterizations of the group as an abstract
identity; (2) the definitions created in the public arena are felt to be more important than other issues;
and (3) actual experiences are subordinated to events or sentiments that arouse strong feelings of
racial group identification. Spokespersons legitimate authority by communicating in public
discussions in the media. These elites add to interpersonal interaction, and groups conceive of
themselves and others through collective processes, especially through the public media. It is this
"sense of social position," emerging from public encounters, that gives race prejudice its basis.
But the spokespersons for the dominant group, who publicly characterize the subordinate
group in a negative way, may be heeded or ignored. If spokespersons are ignored, they have little
effect, and while supported by some, they may be laughed at by others (e.g., the failed religious
crusade to ban rock-and-roll as music of the devil and blacks). On the other hand, spokespersons can
fabricate powerful narratives (e.g., a white woman lied that she was raped by a black man, and whites
murdered blacks in the Tulsa race riot (Madigan 2001)). Finally, the actions that interest groups take
in directing the interpretation of events are not always seen by most participants, but they often
involve well connected politicians and legal officials.
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The problem with Blumer's "sense of group position" and Shibutani and Kwan's "group
consciousness" (1965: 199-223) is that they tend to be more structural than interactionist. It is
similar to expectation states theory that sees the origin of status hierarchies (i.e., difference) as
coming from "doubly dissimilar encounters" where one group has fewer resources and they also have
some sort of group difference that is already identifiable. Knowledge of these differences "diffuse
widely throughout the population and gradually take hold" (Ridgeway et al. 1998:334). However,
two points are important. First, media messages are discussed by friends, neighbors and co-workers
in the multi-step process of communication (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955; Mutz
2006). And these small groups often have opinion leaders. This allows social interaction and ample
room for the operation of multiple GOs. Second, Blumer describes a process that downplays social
interaction. Certainly history and its interpretation has an effect, but all history was once
"interaction" involving concrete people and experiences.
What appears to be missing from Blumer's theory is a social constructionist view of how
difference is created through GOs with dominant and subordinate groups. It is one-sided to hold that
a sense of group position does not come from the experiences of people in daily association (Blumer
1958:6). Thus, an underlying tension in a sense of group position exists between "the Blumer who
emphasizes ongoing interaction among human beings and the Blumer who emphasizes the
relationship between dominant and subordinate groups" (Williams and Correa 2003 :750). More is
needed on GOs in the construction of difference, especially on how the sense of group position
emerges from the Meadian framework with the "I," the "me," and the GO. These mechanisms need
elaboration.
Goffman also focuses on difference through stigma, and deference and demeanor. Stigma
refers to three attributes that are discrediting (Goffman 1963): (1) physical deformities of the body
(e.g., scars), (2) blemishes of individual character (e.g., weak will or domineering passions); and (3)
the "tribal" stigma ofrace, nation, or religion. Stigmatized persons are different from those who are
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categorized as "normals," which is the basis of conflict arising from difference. Stigma is closely
related to deference and demeanor in rituals. Deference is "the appreciation an individual shows of
another to that other" and it can be through avoidance, praise, or other actions. Demeanor is more
indirect as it refers to behavior communicated "through deportment, dress, and bearing" (2005:77).
Both terms focus on messages coming back to form a GO, though Goffman ignores this term. The
third concept of "tribal stigma" proposes group difference especially if it can be inherited. But
Goffman does little or nothing to expand on "tribal stigma" - a concept of difference ever so close to
race and gender - even though it may be inferred to as "abominations of the tribe" (Berbrier
2002:556). Goffman's front and back stages could combine with tribal stigma and translate into dual
consciousness with multiple GOs (Smith 2006:101-2). But he does not pursue this lead, and his
focus is clearly much more on situations rather than on group identity (1988, 2004).
Hughes poses our question strongly in a neglected article entitled "What Other?" He says
that"(o )ne of the complications of civilized life is that one is confronted with a variety of "others,"
some of whose directions are not compatible with those of some others." (1983/1962:122). We
contend that this "other" needs to be further specified and theorized through the theoretical unit of
the significant and GO in an increasingly diverse society (Williams 2002). 6 The next section extends
the GO, especially in developing difference.
Bridging the Gap and Balancing the GO and the Self
Mead's theory needs more emphasis on the mechanisms that compel the "me" of the self to
internalize the norms and values of various GOs and apply the evaluation of these GOs to difference.
This gap in SI can be filled in at least five ways: (1) the concept of role is overused in SI and it needs
work to be delimited; (2) multiple GOs exist and they routinely create multiple selves; (3) a GO is
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Prus mentions "attending to the viewpoints of the other" and "there can be no self without the

other" ( 1997: 6). While he does not use the GO, intersubjectivity would have to flow through GOs.
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socially constructed through framing, not the result of an imposed or taken role, and this process of
social construction may involve internalization and externalization; (4) GOs may be positive and
negative in terms of being a benefit or threat towards the self, and this intrinsically involves
difference; and (5) GOs may be ranked, which most often involves difference, or may be co-equal in
a collection of different others.
Role, Social and Personal GOs. The social construction of multiple GOs in SI needs to clarify

the concept of "role." The use of role is ambiguous in three ways. First, Mead and Blumer use "role"
in their term "taking the role of the other" which often means the empathetic process of"putting
yourself in the place of another."7 This makes it intrinsically part of the GO process. Second, Mead
and Goffman use "role" as a term to designate a situation rather than behavior conducted with fixed
norms and values. This is more akin to Goffman's reference to role in dramaturgical role-taking in
the presentation of the self in rather unstructured situations. A third group of structural theorists
(Turner 1956, 1962; Stryker 2008, 2002; McCall and Simmons 1966, 1982; Burke and Stets 2009)
use the term "role" in a more formal way that refers to the norms and values attached to a position in
society that sometimes leads to a more structural theory of society.
But if one takes all three approaches, nearly all social behavior is "role behavior." For
instance, should we study the "racist role" or "sexist role?" Further, "taking the role of the other" is
making internal social psychological processes into role behavior. This ambiguous use ofroles
simply puts the term into a reductionist position that all social interaction is role behavior. From our
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Blumer often disparaged role theory sometimes with the following story. At a break in labor

negotiations in the steel industry during World War II, the head of the union and his negotiators
dropped to their knees and started praying for the company negotiators. Blumer said that the role of
a union negotiator would not include "praying for management."
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approach, some social interaction involves roles and other interaction does not, and there is a
circumscribed place for "role" as a position in society with clear norms and values.
These different meanings need to be specified, which can be done by putting different
adjectives in front of "role" or by using different terms. Social interaction begets various GOs from
the bottom up, and institutions and organizations can impose roles from the top down. Individuals
perceive "concrete" or "particular others" engaging in behavior, which will be later described as
"staging presentations of selves" through a "me." The perceptions of the behaviors of these concrete
particular others may be grouped into a GO as with a "group GO" composed of a set of friends or a
"situational GO" composed of an audience or group of people at a party. One might like to impose a
role of friend or partygoer on these interactions, but often times people's behaviors are so variegated
that the use of such a formal tenn as "role" is problematic. Often fellow party-goers cannot be
clearly classified into friends, acquaintances, or even enemies. Even using Goffman's approach to
public behavior, these "informal roles" are really practical experiments in "staging presentations of
selves."

On the other hand, there are social situations where roles are of great use. For instance, family
interactions may lead to conceptions of "mother" and "father" as constructed roles, but these roles
become more formalized in historical traditions and laws that have major implications about how
mothers and fathers should act. Child abuse or neglect can easily land a mother or father in jail.
From another perspective, organizations often formulate positions with job descriptions and these
positions become clear roles with norms and values. The professions with the concrete roles of
nurse, teacher, and doctor would fit this use, especially with their codes of ethics and specialized
training. Non-perfonnance of such a formalized or "structured role" can lead to losing the
"structured role" (e.g., mothers or fathers can have their children removed, workers or managers can
be fired, or professionals can lose their licenses). In these cases the socially constructed GOs meet
the more formally constructed aspect of roles.
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Using a more nuanced view of"roles" can help define and specify encounters of the self and
GO, and despite claims to the contrary, avoids sliding all social interaction into roles as a structural
aspect of society as in Stryker (2002) and McCall (1970). There is some evidence of a more
balanced view of roles in a number of theories related to Sl.8 First, Burke and Stets' use of identity
theory sees self-verification processes, while not using the GO, being based on the reflected
appraisals that come from particular others, GOs, or role-based others with person-based, groupbased, and role-based identities (2005: 13-4). And this is very close to Fields et al.'s view that "we
cannot feel shame" or many other emotions "without having developed a generalized other" (2006:
158).9 Second, in self-perception theory, these behavioral assessments with their feelings and
attitudes may be constructed or revised after the fact rather than before by an active evaluation and
framing of one's GO (Bern 1972, Laird 2007). Third, from status expectations theory, "doubly
dissimilar encounters" lead to the development of status value beliefs about categories and groups
rather than just roles (Ridgeway et al. 1998), and how cultural schemas lead to difference codes

8

Using an affect theory within exchange theory, the more social network aspects of the GO can be

formulated with attention to "global emotions" that feed back to the self and are transformed into
"specific emotions" that formulate perceptions of GOs. The outcomes in terms of negative and
positive shared responsibilities would be trust/fear, pride/shame, gratitude/anger, or
attachment/detachment (Lawler et al. 2008).
9

Although Burke and Stets (2009) generally avoid using the GO (e.g., they mention the term once on

p. 20), they differentiate the basis of identities on "role, group, and person" such that "role identities"
are tied to social positions as "a category in society or an organization that an individual occupies"
(2009: 114).
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(Ridgeway 2006). And what are these status expectations other than the feedback of particular or
concrete others aggregated and synthesized into a GO. 10
Multiple GOs. Multiple selves are now well recognized though Mead and Blumer certainly
did not emphasize them as shown above. But William James (1983) referred to multiple selves in
1890 and W. E. B. Du Bois' concept of"double consciousness" provides a clear starting point on
racial difference as African-Americans have two different forms of consciousness or self for whites
and black communities (2005). And in the last two decades, the concept of multiple selves has
become popular (Weigert and Gecas 2003; Thoits 1986; Thoits and Virshup 1997; Markus and Wurf
1989). Following SI theory, if there are multiple selves, there must be multiple GOs.11
The first direct reference to this comes with Shibutani's work using "reference groups."
Robert Merton developed "multiple reference groups," positive and negative reference groups, and
the selection of reference groups (1957: 240-50, 302-8). Shibutani (1961 :514-32; 1955) picked up
on reference groups, and after the preparatory, play and game stages, extends Mead's stage theory to
the "reference group stage" where the interacting individual links to several reference groups.
Society is seen as a mosaic of patterned interactions and relationships that are grouped by many
different reference groups, each with their own "perspective." Charon comments that in Shibutani's
approach "the individual uses several reference groups, has several perspectives, and interacts with a
10

Expectation states and related theories have do not use the GO and mention little about reflected

appraisals. Nonetheless, asking where expectations come from elicit concerns about a GO, but the
closest it comes is "behavioral interchange patterns" (Ridgeway 2006a,b). Although its origins are in
social exchange theory, its focus on hierarchies is somewhat similar to Blumer's "sense of group

position."
11

Burke and Stets concept of "reflected appraisals" would be a much more fragmented and

espisodic view of the GO.
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number of social worlds, and ... therefore ... the individual can no longer be said to have a single
generalized other" (2007: 77-8, 109-14). 12 However, other than Hewitt's mention of "reference
others," Shibutani's use of"reference groups" has been avoided by SI (1988). Nonetheless,
Shibutani hits upon something useful that can be developed. In effect, these stages demonstrate the
development of the GO, which Mead demonstrated with the game stage of understanding other roles
on a baseball team. Instead of the reference group stage, Shibutani is describing the next step with
the say "left fielder" realizing that he or she is on one team and that they are playing a competing
team (Mead 1934: 150-64). This can be called the "group" stage that categorizes the in-group as
contrasted with an out-group. One GO reflects in-group praise for a base hit, but the out-group GO
reflects disapproval for the same act. This simple sports analogy can be generalized for many group
activities from nerds, goths and socials in school to categorical generalizations about deaf, gay and
racial supremacists (Berbrier 2002; Harris 2009). In effect, Shibutani is saying that Mead did not go
quite far enough on this stage theory concerning the formation of GOs.
Stryker sees a similar situation coming out of social networks that are intersected by crosscutting boundaries of class, ethnicity, age, gender, and religion. People live their lives in relatively
smaHsocial networks (Stryker and Burke 2000). This structural SI perspective delimits the
boundaries of a11 these social networks and they are able to block or permit the individuals' access to
these networks. For instance, racial social structures would block an African-American in the 1950s
from the social networks leading to good jobs and elite clubs. Individuals continually have to adjust
their identities and emotions depending on the norms of the network. And if a good fit is lacking, the
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Charon says that Shibutani calls society a "reference group" and the GO is taken as a "perspective"

(1985: 164). He then says that Shibutani used "several reference groups." In figure 11-1, Charon
outlines one GO constructed from multiple perspectives. These shifts from society as a whole to
multiple and smaller reference groups are difficult to reconcile.
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individual may leave (Stryker 2002; Fine 1990, 1991). While he does not develop the concept of the
GO, Stryker's concept of cross-cutting boundaries and "small and specialized networks" suggest
multiple GOs.
Selecting, Shaping and Framing. An adequate view of the GO needs concepts with which
individuals select and shape multiple GOs out of social networks, whether they are cross-cutting or
not. The self is not passive toward its GOs as it actively frames and shapes them. Each person only
takes some of what they see from reflected appraisals and ignore other items (Kinch 1963; Lundgren
2004). Thus, a "selective reinforcement" process that is not deterministic exists between self and
"significant and generalized others" (Yeung and Martin 2003: 844; Quarantelli and Cooper 1967;
Miyamoto and Dornbusch 1956). When people are young and malleable during primary
socialization, "internalization" may be the most important result of the messages coming from
multiple GOs. During adolescence teenagers often rebel against a familial GO, and construct new or
modified selves as peer groups construct GOs (e.g., goths, varsity, nerds, socials, etc). As one's
sense of self becomes firmer, people often engage more in "externalization" as they try to impose
their "selves" and the way the GO should interpret them (Yeung and Martin 2003: 846).
Identification others are important for solidarity since "they are like me" or "they are like what I want
to be"; and valuation others that consist of others who pass judgments on you, often negatively (e.g.,
cliques, gangs, managers, teachers, juries, ethnic or racial groups, etc.) (Turner and Stets 2004;
Turner 1988, Turner 1956). This basically corresponds to internalization and externalization.
First, groups of higher status people or more forceful personalities often externalize their
evaluations of others - "oppressive othering" or "other-categorization"- often accompanied by
"powerful virtual selves" to which subordinates may respond with "defensive othering," "trading
power for patronage," and "forming subcultures" (Schwalbe et al. 2000: 422-9; West and
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Fenstermaker 2002: 146-63). 13 These strategies are the result of several presentations of self (i.e., the
me's advanced in interaction) with specific motives and intentions. Conversely, selves may
internalize the view of critical GOs and accept imposed evaluations as with the internalization of
labeling theory or Garfinkel's degradation ceremony (1967). For instance, shame may occur when
one takes the role of the GO and realizes that others see one's "base motives" rather than one's
"glowing self image," and embarrassment may occur when one takes of the role of the GO and
realizes that one has "bungled a presentation of self' (Shott 1979: 1325) (See table l).
********** Table I**********
And there is a GO created in specific interactions or carried from one interaction to another, and a
GO that is free from interaction and free floating.
Second, when encountering externalization or valuation, people create or modify their own
group's GOs through internalization. Usually these are positive evaluations but when confronted
with negative imposed GOs, they often must modify or create new subcultures with their own GOs.
DuBois' "dual consciousness" is a good example of this. In column 3 of table I, we illustrated three
different high status and three different low status processes for creating internal or identification
GOs. According to SI, each GO then leads to the construction of specific and multiple selves, but
clearly, the GO plays a role in creating or modifying that self. While this construction benefits from
many of the terms used by Schwalbe et al. (2000), table I also includes the rows 7 ->8 ->9 and 16
-> 17 -> I 8 that indicate processes that involve some countering of the dominant processes of
13

We use Schwalbe et al.'s (2000) negotiated order perspective, but our use of the "other" differs.

They define "othering" as "the process whereby a dominant group defines into existence an inferior
group (2000:422) using four generic processes of oppressive "othering," subordinate adaptation,
boundary maintenance, and emotional management. Their approach to the "other" is a more oneway view of how GOs operate (2000:421).
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inequality. In other words, not all high status persons possess "powerful virtual selves" as some are
weak links and wastrels who try to manipulate their situations, and not all low status persons accept
"oppressive others" as some are protesters who engage in resistance and "counter-othering" (e.g.,
Malcolm X's revisioning of white behaviors). Thus, GOs have a combined and interactive process of
"assertion and assignment" with externalization through framed, shaped and selected others, and
internalization by imposed groups, behaviors and structures (Berbrier quoting S. Cornell (2008:479)).

Positive and Negative GOs. GOs have a relationship between each other and often have
positive and negative characteristics (Perinbanayagam 1975: 514-5; Lawler et al 2008: 523; Crouch
1958). Some GOs are more intrinsic to the construction of the self and are highly internalized. Other
GOs are disputed and resisted (see 16 ---> 17 ---> I 8 in table 1). For instance, African-Americans with a
dual consciousness have one GO composed of fellow African-Americans and many of them in this
GO have a favorable viewpoint of each other. They may also have a white oppositional GO that they
negatively internalize and actively resist. Both have an effect, but it is clear that GOs are not always
positive, and that the existence of negative GOs are the clear indicators of difference, whether it is
based on race or gender, or any other aspect of life (e.g., teams, in-crowds, gamblers, etc.). Thus, the
actual assessments of a person do not lead deterministically to one or another GO (Yeung and Martin
2003; Jchiyama 1993; Felson 1985, 1993). Shibutani's master processes of ethnic relations are at
work in these positive and negative evaluations (1970). Differentiating processes occur with stable
relations of inequality, but they are often brought about by more disjunctive processes coming out of
protest and conflict. Sustaining processes involve mutual support in stable and homogenous social
worlds, and they are brought about by integrative processes whereby groups become identified as
similar (Shibutani 1970; Wacker 1995).
Negative and positive appraisals imply a ranking, which Lewis refers to as "ordered into a
hierarchy ofrelevancies" (I 979: 284). Burke goes further on the "self-verification" among identities
and comes close to multiple GOs in his "general principles": (1) people seek out situations to verify
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identities, (2) sitnations contain meanings that activate identities, (3) identities with common means
are activated together and develop similar levels of salience, (4) identities adjust to pressures of
situations, (5) multiple identities among people result in complex and sometimes contradictory
reactions despite some similarities, (6) identities higher in the salience hierarchy are more likely to be
verified, and (7) identities with more commitment take preference in verification processes
(2003:203). Although Burke focuses more on identity and only implies a GO, his focus is analogous
to ours, as we could nearly replace identity and "reflected appraisals" with a combination of selves
and GOs. 14
In evaluating how much influence two GOs might have, a process similar to differential
association theory operates whereby the "I" evaluates two different groups in terms of an
accumulation of definitions, values, or positions that one has in common with one group or the other
(Title, Burke and Jackson 1986; Akers and Jensen 2006). However, the exact mechanisms of
ranking in terms of the GO's importance to the self may be conscious or unconscious and this is an
important complexity in the process as indicated in the discussion about unconscious racism
(Quillian 2008). Ranking is done partly on the basis of comfort level of emotions, but also on the
basis of aspirations for social and cultural capital as in interaction ritual chains -- one may admire a
group of people with whom they currently feel very uncomfortable (Collins 1988, 2004). In this
sense, two networks and their values are weighed both rationally and emotionally in terms of positive
and negative experiences. The relative weights of these experiences will shift one toward one or the

14

Mead's theory is analogous to Burke's (2006) identity control theory: the 'self is "identity;"

'presentations of self would be akin to "identity standards;" the 'generalized and significant others'
would be approximated by "perceptions;" "reflected appraisals" or the "reflected self'; and the 'I'
would operate like the "comparator" in evaluating feedback and making adjustments. But the group
nature of"perceptions" and "reflected appraisals" seem to be downplayed in Burke's approach.
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other GO, but third or fourth GOs may also exist. For instance, one may decide between the
upwardly mobile GO does not accept you, and the poor neighborhood GO who does. But a kin
group that is strongly in favor of upward mobility may turn the tide toward the upwardly mobile GO
in forming the self.
Changes or disturbances in the feedback coming from a GO can lead to changes in self
identity. Laub finds that "turning points were critical to understanding processes of change" for
criminals, and that these turning points away from crime tended to come from "job stability and
marital attachment in adulthood" (2006:243). More generally, Burke (2006: 85, 94) finds three
reasons for identity changes which we can mold toward SI: (a) persistent discrepancies in feedback
from a GO leading to slow change, (b) "multiple identities activated together, whose verifications
require opposing meanings, and (c) catastrophic events that impose new GOs and identities
(sometimes destroying some old ones). We can add another change when a neophyte enters an
entirely new situation and encounters many new groups when old statuses are canceled out (e.g., do
not wear your high school varsity jacket in college).
Further, a coalition theory of GOs would supplement the balance of positive and negative
experiences (e.g., differential association theory). Thus, primary group GOs based on family, school
and peer groups might combine with work, religious, political, friendship, recreational, voluntary and
other GOs. In some ways, a cross-pressure theory of social constructed GOs could be developed.
But GOs need not be ranked when people see themselves in equally valued groups. For instance, one
might equally value GOs based on church members, golf buddies, and neighbors. Thus, GOs may
simply exist in their own co-equal and valued spheres. However, it is when some of them are
negative and ranked that GOs assume importance for constructing difference.
We use two studies - black Americans pursuing upward mobility, and teamwork and gender
among autoworkers -to illustrate this ranking process. For the racial example, Author B (2008)
interviewed Burton, a black male professional from an English-speaking Caribbean country. His first
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GO is based on family. His mother was a significant other for pursuing academic goals, and his
extended family also reinforced his mother's views toward schooling. His education in this
Caribbean country was quite good and took place after his country gained independence from the
British. Consequently, he went to school under a proud and dominant black majority school system
and did not have a dual consciousness with a negative white GO. This changed when Burton came to
the US. He said "I didn't know I was black" until he came here, which indicates a strong "white
generalized other" that has a number of negative messages about performance. Although he
overcame these "reflected appraisals," they strongly affected him. Partially as a result, he saw
religion as a significant source of positive motivation in his life and fellowship with his church was
very important. Thus, his second GO is formed on what he has framed as the white society,
especially at work, and in response to this he selected and shaped a third GO based on his
relationship with white and black church members. A specific GO that focused on AfricanAmericans was somewhat absent (see Figure I for these GOs).

**********Figure 1**********
Second, Dorothy is an African-American woman who serves as provost at a university and
has four different GOs. The first GO involves her family, especially her mother, who was very
central to the construction of her own self. Although she grew up in "pretty much a ghetto," her
mother was the key person in getting her to pursue higher education. Dorothy's mother provided
encouragement as well as a source of confidence-building when GOs collided. She encountered
positive and negative generalized others from both white and blacks. One negative example comes
from a moment where she was confronted by a white professor who said "You will never make it
here because you're from" ... the ghetto and you "students don't have the intellect to get through."
This negative, white generalized other was second in importance to the construction of her self in
challenging her to not only finish her education at a top university but eventually to pursue and
receive a Ph.D. as well. Later Dorothy ran into the same professor who said: "Oh my goodness! ...
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you're about as rare as this Susan B. Anthony dollar." She took this in a negative way, but her
familial GO helped her interpret the comments in a uniquely positive way and boosted her self
confidence. Dorothy's negative and white GO was also important when she entered and eventually
succeeded in academia. "But you have a large number of people who also don't believe that."' A
third GO that was central to the creation and maintenance of Dorothy's self was a black, sub-cultural
GO. This GO was largely negative and this affected her more deeply than the racism of the first
white GO. "I was living in" a black community who said "'Oh, you're not dark enough."' She was
constantly being accused of not being in touch with black issues and felt that she did not fit
anywhere. Again, her familial GO continued to serve as a constant source of support and helped her
to get through this issue. A fourth GO was more positive and came later from white staff members
who did not buy into the racial ideology that blacks were in top positions just because of the color of
their skin. These whites were important to her because they prevented her from becoming bitter and
from lumping whites into one category. They worked together well with her and respected her
expertise and judgment. See figure 1, part I to compare these persons' GOs.
In a gender study, Author C looked at a Japanese transplant, and an automotive parts supplier.
In the main auto transplant, team leaders preferred gender-mixed teams because the blend of
feminine and masculine gives teams a family atmosphere. Janice found that in the initial phases,
teams in the main transplant were structured around "the guys versus the girls" dichotomy. GOs
were then refashioned from gender or racial binaries to "my work team." She found that some male
team members even felt more comfortable when more women were around. The presence of women
on the line brings not only a new level of calmness, but also a feeling of security. One male team
member said he does not want to ever have to work in a male-dominated group because it resembles
working in a prison. For Janice, the supportive team GO assumes more importance than either male
or female GOs (part 2 in figure I). One man said: "I am looking at you like a person, not at your
sex, race .... I don't really care if somebody is a minority or not." Thus, for Janice the team GO was
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a stronger influence on her than a gendered which have not disappeared but are ranked lower (part 2,
figure 1).
In the supplier plant, GOs were ranked differently because gender had more prominence as a
GO. First, there seemed to be a difference concerning injuries. Cynthia thought that the men's
higher injury rate was due to their "macho attitude" that they cannot get hurt. She said: "Guys feel
they are tough ... they are risk-takers and their egos get them in trouble." Some men agree that some
of them want to get the work done without taking care of safety, and are more reckless with their
bodies than women. A few team members said that women have safer behavior because of their
experience with raising children and being a caretaker at home. Gendered others were also strong
because relationships between female team members are sometimes described as catty or nitpicky.
Jealousy was apparent between women who worked in predominantly female teams. Cynthia said:
"When I started seeing this guy, I don't know if it was jealousy, but the other girls stopped talking to
me .... " She also said: When an attractive girl ... would come to the group, they did not want
anything to do with her ... Nobody will talk to her." Male teams have more competition and trash
talking, and they have macho attitude of picking on the weaker guys. One man said: "Guys are
harder on one another ... Look at that sissy, he can't keep up.'" Gendered GOs ranked higher with
people in the supplier plant. Thus, when the ranking of GOs are compared in figure I, the team GO
ranked higher than the gendered others for the transplant workers, and just the opposite in the
supplier plant.
Thus, both studies illustrate the different ways that GOs are shaped, framed, ranked and
utilized by four different groups of people.
A Model of Selves and GOs
The processes outlined by Mead and Blumer need to be brought up to date concerning multiple
selves and GOs. Stets and Burke (2000:230) have done work in specifying the selection of identities
through their concept of salience based on accessibility and fit. We follow their example about the
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self and then specify the processes involved concerning the GO. This approach shows multiple
forms of "selves," "me's" and "GOs" in Figure 2.

**********Figure 2**********
The basic model shows how a self monitors situations (1 and 2) and the "!" (3), and then it presents
various selves or "me's" (5) through staging (4) and framing (6) in social interaction situations (8).
The self collects the reactions of the others in social interaction by constructing GOs (7), which are
then fed back into the self and the "I." Through socialization, individuals may have a number of
GOs (e.g., my family, people at work, whites and blacks, etc.).15 While framing may be used in
staging and the presentation of self, this paper stresses the framing that goes on concerning the GO in
item 6 of figure 2. "Selecting" places the people who fit into one's various GOs and it also involves
a sense that one knows how others think about these groupings. More internalized "framing"
involves the social organization of those people concerning situations, emotions, values, and norms
that make this GO somewhat coherent and worthy of being recognized. "Ranking" involves seeing
each GO as positive, negative, or neutral, and assessing this GO's importance to the individual's self.
While ranking may be intense due to positive and negative aspects of difference, ranking may also be
oflesser importance for people whose lives are less contested. The different GOs are the sum of(a)
one's impression of their own staged and framed performances before others (3-->4-->5-->8 and
3-->6-->5-->8 in figure 2), (b) one's estimate of the others' judgments or reactions (8-->7), and (c)
one's selecting, shaping and ranking of the judgments and emotional reactions involving these GOs
(7->6).16
15

This model is based partly on Turner and Collins (1989) and Turner (1988).

16

Each presentation of a "me" does not create a separate "GO" because this would then overly

saturate the self formation model with GOs. But each GO is constructed from different groupings of
various presentations of self.
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Regarding difference, an individual may feel either high or low rank (to make it simple), and
those status rankings are associated with various positive or negative emotions resulting in GOs
being validated, questioned or rejected. But an individual may have a number of GOs that are
relatively co-equal without any particular rank. Various selves are then constructed or reconstructed
based on the feedback generated by a number of GOs. It is important to note that these GOs are
framed or constructed themselves. Individuals can choose to ignore people as inconsequential,
biased, or programmed; however, some people in coercive situations cannot be overlooked (e.g.,
prisoners cannot ignore gnards). This is how the GO differs from roles. Organizations and social
interaction of others create roles, but the GO is based on those persons whom the individual
recognizes as being important enough to monitor, select, and shape. One can even operate in the
interstices of roles. The components of the GO need not always be direct contacts. They can also
consist of indirect contacts who may comment on their presentations of self made to others (e.g.,
Iago's invidious comments about Desdemona to Othello). Thus, GOs have a connection with direct
interaction through the looking glass self, and also an indirect connection without interaction with the
generalized group. But they do not include everyone in the community, as is sometimes implied by
Mead.
The importance of multiple and somewhat specific GOs is that researchers should pay much
more attention to how people frame the others whom they attend to, and also pay attention to those
whom they might ignore. This would also involve the differences between "perceived GOs" (what
you think the GO sees) and "actual GOs" (what the others actually see) (Quarantelli and Cooper
1967:296). The easiest way to identify a GO is when a person refers to "we," "us", "them," or
"they," and the singular and plural "you" (Wiley 1994; Dunn 1998). One most often constructs a
"we's" or "they's" at work, in one's social life, and in one's family and neighborhood. The key to
finding "multiple GOs" and in the process finding "multiple selves" is to locate who might be in the
GO being discussed. This is real social construction, not imposing role-taking or a group (Turner
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1956; Turner 1988; Stryker and Burke 2000; Stryker 2002). This would benefit by more attention to
social network data for each GO and attention to who knows whom in these networks since the
transmissibility of norms and behaviors may be dependent on the density of these networks.
Difference emerges from this model from two directions: (1) it is socially constructed by the
GO in many different encounters (internalization), and (2) it is socially imposed from the group level
often in a historical context (externalization). The first approach fuses the processes of multiple GOs
with expectations states theory. It looks at the encounters, interactions, and exchanges of people in
groups to create a sense of difference. The difference then follows the tenets of "a sense of group
position" especially with groups developing and promoting their interests based on this difference.
The second approach takes a "larger sense of group position" as already established with individuals
and smaller groups contextualized in these situations. However, it must be recognized that this
"sense of group position" must be accepted by individuals and they often do not automatically accept
it. People either are not aware of other's warnings of"group position" or don't believe it. Social
construction emerges again as each person tests their apparent 'group position,' and ifrebuffed by
the other group, are more inclined to recognize it. However, this testing does not occur continuously
and some people simply accept their "sense of group position," sometimes when contrary
interactions are present.
Using "individual" and "overall" GOs (Dodds et al. 1997), the creation of a larger "sense of
group position" or difference would be the movement from a number of specific GOs at work, at
school, in the neighborhood, and on the street to a more abstract GO that focuses on strangers
categorized into large categories. This "meta-GO" then becomes an overarching marker of
difference in social interaction, and it then gets built up into a structural feature of society. With
evidence from specific interactions gathered into GOs, the "meta-GO" as "a sense of group position"
becomes a guide to behavior where individual interactions are no longer relevant.
Conclusion
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There is a rich body of literature on difference in SI; however, there are oversights with respect
to systematically applying the basic concepts of the theory, especially in not using the GO. While
some theorists mention difference in general, difference is conceptualized too broadly, when it
actually needs more specificity. A key to solving this problem is to develop the original SI concept
of the GO into multiple GOs, which match multiple selves, and show how they develop together.
From there, the selfs conceptions of difference can be constructed from multiple GOs.
Two points about the GO are especially important. First, the GO should be re-conceptualized
and made multiple, and then GOs will provide the basis for socially constructing difference through
Blumer's sense of group position. This involves recognizing that multiple selves routinely exist and
they come from multiple GOs. They are socially constructed through framing, not always the result
of roles, and this process of social construction may involve internalization and externalization.
Further, each GO can be conceptualized as a social network which may or may not be a group. And
finally, GOs most often are ranked in terms of importance to the self, or they maybe co-equal and
simply different parts of life. But when they are ranked, difference typically occurs.
Second, difference emerges from these ranked GOs. When many people realize that they have
constructed a racial or gendered GO that is similar to other peoples' GO, they form a sense of group
position. Thus, when intersubjective GOs overlap a great deal between people through the
intersections of their social constructions, a sense of group position develops, but when GOs have
only minimal overlap with group members, then a sense of group position will not form even though
people are still connected. "Identification" GOs are likely to overlap, and "valuation" GOs are less
likely to connect (Turner and Stets 2004). Thus, by mapping out multiple GOs and ranking them, the
commonality of particular GOs that people have with many others demonstrates the social
construction of a sense of group position, which seems to be missing in traditional SI accounts.
Thus, the self monitors situations and the"!" presents various selves or "me's" through staging and
framing in social interaction situations. The self collects the reactions of the others in social
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interaction by constructing GOs, which are then fed back into the self and the I. These different GOs
are the sum of one's impression of their own staged and framed performances, one's estimate of the
others' reactions, and one's selecting, framing and ranking of the judgments and emotional reactions
ofGOs.
Schwalbe and colleagues (2000) consist of the strongest attempt to focus on "othering," but an
entire issue of Symbolic Interaction (Anderson and Snow, 2001) that was devoted to inequality only
mentions the "GO" once. And while "others evaluations," "othering" and "reflected appraisals"
briefly appear, the emphasis is on singular rather than multiple processes, and on what we refer to as
externalization rather than internalization. The contribution of this paper is to add a more theoretical
dimension to Schwalbe et al. in order to specify the mechanisms of the GO to make "othering" a
deeper and more complex process that is both external and internal, active and re-active, and
preceding the re-creation of the self. Some interactionists hint at this when referring to a need to deal
with the intersections of multiple forms of inequality in gender, race and class (Hall 2003: 40-2), and
the active nature ofreflective appraisal processes (Anderson and Snow 2001: 400).
There are two further developments that need to be made in research concerning the GO.
First, framing needs to be more consistently developed to go beyond Goffman's notion of situational
framing, and the social movement use of ideological framing appears to be helpful. In the three part
theory of framing the GO presented here, "selecting" concerns the choice of persons to be in ones
various GOs, "framing" is the ideational content that puts these people together through situations or
ideas, and "ranking" looks at how they see some GOs being more important than others. Further
research in this area would bring out all three of these processes. Second, the formation ofGOs lays
the basis for extending SI further in the direction of social structure. This would lead first to a "sense
of group position" and then to "public opinion" and a link could be made to Stryker's structural SI.

It is often said that SI is a paradigm or framework instead of a theory, while identity theory
and affect theories in social exchange are increasing their specification of processes and contexts.
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And in some ways but not all, they are coming closer to SI. SI needs to extend itself in similar ways
and this will lead to major theoretical developments. This paper has argued that this can occur by
balancing its concepts of the self and GO, and in bridging to other identity and exchange theories by
specifying its processes in useful and sometimes analogous ways.
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Figure 1: Comparisons aud Transformations of Multiple Generalized Others
1.

African-American and Afro-Caribbean Mobility:
Dorothy: an African-American
Ph.D. professor and Provost

Burton: an Afro-Caribbean Ph.D.
and College Professor
We-identification others

GO 1 ~Afro-American friends &
family

GO,~ Afro-Caribbean friends & family

+
GO 2 ~A multi-racial American church

G02 ~ White staff and friends in
favor of black upward mobility

GO3 ~ White and Afro-American
acquaintances in favor of mobility

GO 3 ~ African-Americans who feel
that she is not black enough.

GO 4 ~ White discrimination and
prejudice at work

G0 4 ~ White discrimination &
prejudice at work
They-valuation others

2.

Japanese Transplant Automotive Assembly Plaut aud Supplier:
Cynthia: White woman on the

Janice: White woman on the line
at a Japanese transplant

line at an automotive suppliE:r

We-identification others
GO,~ Men at work

GO,~ Supportive team members

+
GO2 ~ Supportive group members

GO 2 ~ Women at work

GO3 ~ Other women at work
rriembers

GO 3 = Inconsequential team

GO 4 ~ Other men at work

GO 4 ~ Inconsequential group
members
They-valuation others
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Figure 2: A Model of the Parallel Process of Self Formation and Social Action

(1) Multiple
selves: Selfs
perception of
material, survival,
& social identities:
- Self 1
- Self 2
- Self 3

-

(2) Monitoring:
Monitoring and
interpreting of
situations and
events at work,
home, and
elsewhere

-

Ir-

(3) The I:
Strategically
selecting a
salient self
or selves in
choosing to

act.

(4) Staging:
creating,
preparing, &
adjusting the
ritual (cultural
scripts)

\

Objectifying different 'me' paths

~

____.

I

(5) The Me's
or presentation
of selves:

-Me

h,b,c

-Me2a,b,c
-Me3a,b,c

\\l

Using various
resources

I

(6) Social construction
of generalized others:
Creating GOs based on
the performances of
various Me's:

- GO
- GO
- GO

I based on Mel a,b,c
2 based on Me 2 a,b,c
3 based on Me 3 a,b,c

"

(8) Social action:
Social interaction with

others:
- habit, tradition
- emotion
- reason (practical,
procedural, value, or
theoretical)

!I
(7) Framing:
- Selecting the people
in the GO other
- Shaping the
ideas & behavior
that bring them
together,
- Ranking GOs

'

Multiple 'me 's contributing to 'generalized other' paths
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Table 1: Constructions of Generalized Others (GO) based on Self-Perceptions'

High

Attributions of Inequality

External or Valuation
Ge11eralized Others

l11ternal or lde11tification
Ge11era/ized Others

]-Merit-based status:
High rank due to
ability or entitlement.

2-Self-justified othering:
Validated rank of GO
compared to others with
pride, satisfaction, or arrogance.

3- "Powe1ful virtual selves": b
Positive GO based on confidence
and positive emotions (with
infrequent conversions to the
other side with an alternate GO).

4-Ascription:

5- "Defensive othering": b
Ambivalence and uneasiness
about won rank compared
to lower GO.

6-Defensive internalization:
Positive GO and self based on
ambivalent status with some
defensive emotions.

7-Being protected:
High rank due to bias and
discrimination against others.

8-Oppressive othering:
Fear oflosing high rank with
guilt, anger and rectitude
about own and lower GO.

9-Manipulative internalization:
GO based on active repression
of others.

JO-Degraded status:
Low rank due to the
lack of personal or group
ability or talent.

11-Accepted othering:
Acceptance of imposed
and superior GO based on
deference & shame.

12-Creating negative sub-cultures:
Negative GO based on deference
and respect for authority, and
low self esteem often involving
deviance and dropping out.

13-Group Subordination:

14- "Defensive othering": b
Acceptance of superior GO
but ambivalence and anxiety
about imposed GO.

15-Adaptational othering:
GO and self based on "trading
power for patronage" or "forming
sub-cultures" with opportunism. b

17-Counter-othering:
Angry rejection of imposed
GO and construction of
positive alternative GO.

18-Creating positive sub-cultures:
GO based on active resistance
and re-interpretation of ones
own group.

Status High rank due to
ascription, family or luck.

Low

Status Low rank due to luck,
ascription, or chance

16-Discr;,,dnation:
Low rank due to
discrimination and bias

Notes:
"Draws upon Turner and Stets (2004 ).
b Headings in quotation marks come from Schwalbe et al. (2000).
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